Court issues reasons for authorising new prosecution of Ronnie Coulter for murder of Surjit Singh Chhokar

The High Court of Justiciary Appeal Court granted an application by the Lord Advocate to bring a new prosecution against Ronnie Coulter after ruling that new evidence which emerged after the original trial, that he had admitted the offence, “substantially” strengthened the case against him.

However, the judges held that it was “not in the interests of justice” to set aside the acquittals of two other men, Andrew Coulter and David Montgomery, who had been found not guilty of the murder following a subsequent trial.

The Lord Justice General, Lord Carloway , sitting with Lady Dorrian and Lord Malcolm, heard that the first respondent Ronnie Coulter was acquitted in March 1999 after a trial on an indictment which libelled murder against him only, albeit “while acting with others”.

The second and third respondents, Andrew Coulter and David Montgomery, were acquitted in November 2000 after a subsequent trial against them on an indictment for murder, which did not libel concert in the murder with the first respondent.

But following the introduction of the Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011, Crown applied to the court to set aside the acquittals and to grant authority to bring a new prosecution against them.

The Lord Advocate maintained that, subsequent to the respective acquittals of the first two respondents, evidence that each had made certain admissions was discovered.

The Crown also claimed that new evidence has emerged against each of the three respondents following their acquittals.

In seeking to have the acquittal of the first respondent set aside, the Crown pointed first to admissions by him to his sister, Margaret Chisholm, while he was on remand and after he had been acquitted.

Secondly, the first respondent’s brother-in-law Martin Duncan had come forward with evidence to the effect that, between the dates of the two trials, when the first and second respondents had both been in his car, the first respondent had said “We’ve got away with it”, referring to the death of the deceased.

Another man, Hugh Langford, had also recently reported that, on the day of the second respondent’s acquittal, both the first and the second respondents had been “showboating” about “getting off with it” and about the success of their plan to blame one another.

And Katelyn Finlay, whose mother had been in a relationship with the first respondent, had recently volunteered that the first respondent had said to her mother: “Aye, I done it”.

The Crown also founded upon new evidence from Mrs Chisholm, who had now said that the first respondent had asked her to find a knife – presumably the murder weapon – which had been deposited somewhere between Overtown and Gowkthrapple, although she failed to do so.

She also said that while the first respondent was still in custody he had asked her to buy a set of knives, take out the smallest one and put it in a drawer in his flat, but she did not do so.

The judges ruled that it was “highly likely” that a reasonable jury would have convicted the first respondent on the basis of the evidence at his trial together with the new material, including the admissions.

Delivering the opinion of the court, the Lord Justice General said: “As the first respondent recognised, it is a short step to holding that this evidence strengthens substantially the ‘case’, that is to say the evidence at the original trial, against the first respondent.”

But the court was unable to reach the same conclusion in relation to the second and third respondents.

Lord Carloway added: “The court is concerned to note that, in relation to the second and third respondents, the new material generally appears to point to the first respondent as the principal actor. The effect of that is that, as distinct from the position of the first respondent, were a new prosecution to be authorised the applicant would be proceeding against the second and third respondents on a quite different basis from that which they faced at their original trial.

“Permitting acquitted persons to face such a prospect, and allowing such a volte face on the part of the Crown, are important considerations to weigh in the balance in favour of the second and third respondents. The Crown elected to proceed in the manner which they did at the second trial.

“Having regard to the interests of justice, the court is not persuaded that it is right that they should, on the somewhat flimsy basis of the new material, be allowed to revert to a position which they might have adopted against the same respondents in the first place upon more or less the same material.

“Having considered all the circumstances, the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that the acquittal of the first respondent be set aside. It will therefore authorise a new prosecution in his case.”