Doctor erased from register after domestic abuse conviction loses appeal against GMC tribunal decision

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2024] CSIH 27
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Court of Session Inner House
• Judge:
  Lady Dorrian

Dr Muhammad Masood was made subject to fitness to practice proceedings by the General Medical Council after allegations of abuse were made against him by his ex-wife. He argued that the Medical Practitioners Tribunal had not been entitled to make the findings it did on the evidence, and that erasure was wholly disproportionate as a sanction.

The appeal was heard by the Lord Justice Clerk, Lady Dorrian, together with Lord Malcolm and Lord Tyre. The appellant appeared as a party litigant while the respondent was represented by Byrne KC.

Reputation of the profession

After qualifying in Pakistan in 1997, the appellant came to the UK and worked as a doctor from August 2003. While visiting Pakistan in November 2016 he married Ms A, who then joined him in the UK on a spouse visa. However, in November 2017 they returned to Pakistan where he arranged to have divorce papers served on her without her knowledge. Ms A reported the appellant to Police Scotland in August 2018 and raised concerns with the GMC.

In December 2019 the appellant was found to have committed an offence arising from an instance of emotional abuse against Ms A and received an absolute discharge. On 20 October 2023, the Tribunal issued its decision in the fitness to practice proceedings raised against the appellant. Although it rejected 92 per cent of Ms A’s allegations, it found that he had physically and emotionally abused her, and that he had attempted to interfere with proceedings by instructing a lawyer in Pakistan to write to a doctor providing support for Ms A soliciting them to withdraw a report.

The Tribunal considered that the allegations of physical abuse and procedural interference amounted to serious misconduct with the context of domestic violence being an aggravating factor, and that it could not be said there was little risk of repetition. It concluded that, while it was clear that the appellant was a good doctor held in high esteem by patients and colleagues, a sanction of erasure was necessary in the circumstances as his actions had seriously undermined the reputation of the profession.

It was submitted by the appellant that, as only a small number of Ms A’s allegations had been accepted by the Tribunal, her evidence ought not to have been preferred over his. Further, erasure was wholly disproportionate as a sanction given that he had not been suspended during the investigation and that erasure would deprive his local community of an experienced clinician.

No basis to interfere

Lady Dorrian, delivering the opinion of the court, began by observing: “The Tribunal proceeded exactly as it should, and reminded itself fully of the principles upon which it should proceed. The Tribunal proceeded to address each individual allegation; examined the evidence relevant thereto; considered whether there was supportive or objective evidence available; and reached a conclusion in respect of each. We can detect no flaw in the Tribunal’s approach.”

She continued: “Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, the Tribunal did not merely accept the evidence of Ms A in preference to that of the appellant. In some instances, indeed, it preferred the evidence of the appellant. What the Tribunal did was examine the evidence regarding each allegation separately, taking a discerning approach. In circumstances where it accepted evidence of Ms A it did so because it was supported by other, objective, evidence and having regard to its likelihood when considered in light of the whole evidence.”

Assessing whether erasure was an appropriate sanction, Lady Dorrian said: “The appellant’s good character was not ‘dismissed’ at the sanction stage. Rather, the import of the Tribunal’s decision is that it was not of sufficient weight, in light of the other factors, to render suspension appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The fact that there had been no repetition to date did not preclude the Tribunal from finding that it could not conclude that there would be no repetition in the future. The Tribunal reasoned that there may have been no repetition of the conduct involved in the interference allegation standing there being no need for the appellant to protect his interests.”

She concluded: “In appeals of this kind the court may only interfere with the decision of the specialist Tribunal if it is seriously flawed or manifestly wrong. The court may correct egregious errors of fact, or errors of law; it may interfere if important evidence has been left out of account; or misinterpreted in a significant way; or where the reasoning cannot be defended according to the principles applicable. What it cannot do is simply remake the decision according to its own views of the case. The appellant has established no basis upon which we could justifiably interfere with the decision of the Tribunal.”

The appeal was therefore refused.