Four-year jail term for causing death by dangerous driving while drunk not ‘unduly lenient’

A sentence of four years’ imprisonment imposed on a motorist who was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving while almost three times the legal limit for alcohol was not “unduly lenient”, appeal judges have ruled.

In refusing a Crown appeal against sentence, the Criminal Appeal Court held that while the respondent’s blood-alcohol reading was “very high”, there was no evidence that he had been driving at “excessive speed” or that he had performed a “dangerous manoeuvre”.

Lady Smith, Lady Dorrian and Lord Bracadale heard that on 7 December 2015 at the High Court at Aberdeen on an indictment in terms of section 76 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 the respondent Russell McKeever pled guilty to a contravention of section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The charge narrated that the respondent caused the death of Colin Taylor by driving a motor car dangerously and having consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his blood was not less than 226 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The charge went on to narrate that while his ability to drive was impaired through the consumption of alcohol the respondent drove on the opposing lane of the carriageway and collided with another motor car as a result of which Colin Taylor, aged 59 years, was injured and died and Julie Taylor, his wife, was severely injured and permanently impaired.

The court was also told that respondent had a number of previous convictions for road traffic matters.

On 6 January 2016, after obtaining a criminal justice social work report, the presiding judge sentenced the respondent to four years’ imprisonment discounted from six years, disqualified him from driving for a period of six years and eight months, discounted from 10 years, and ordered him to sit the extended driving test.

By note of appeal, the Crown challenged the sentence of four years imprisonment, contending that it was “unduly lenient”.

The ground of appeal averred that the trial judge had “failed to give due weight to the gravity of the offence”.

It was submitted that the offence was aggravated by the respondent committing the offence while almost three times the legal limit for alcohol, he caused the death of one person and serious injury to another and this while having a record for speeding.

Therefore, it was argued that in the circumstances the headline sentence of six years was “inappropriate”.

It was also averred that the level of discount applied was “disproportionately high” when considering the overall aspect on the sentence imposed, but the appeal judges refused the appeal.

Delivering the opinion of the court, Lord Bracadale said: “The level of alcohol in the blood of the respondent was, on any view, very high. There was, however, no indication of excessive speed or of the respondent having embarked on a dangerous manoeuvre such as inappropriate overtaking or of gross impairment.

“Driving of that sort, taken along with the level of alcohol would almost certainly have placed the offence within level 1 of the guideline and indicated a significantly higher headline sentence.

“Having regard to the absence of driving of that nature and the concession by the advocate depute that the sentencing judge had taken all relevant circumstances into account and had appropriately selected level 2 of the guideline as applicable, we consider that the sentencing judge’s selection of a headline sentence of six years imprisonment cannot be said to fall outwith the range of disposals open to him.”

As to discount, the appeal judges said the level of discount to be applied was primarily a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge.

Lord Bracadale added: “Having regard to the explanation of the history of the section 76 procedure we are unable to say that the sentencing judge erred in selecting the level of discount which he did.

“Even if it were open to criticism as being generous in the light of delay between appearance on petition and tendering of the letter, we are satisfied that it cannot be said to have resulted in an unduly lenient sentence.”