English High Court judge finds insurer of stolen motorbike liable in personal injury accident by injured passenger unaware of theft

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] EWHC 523 (KB)
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  England and Wales High Court
• Judge:
  His Honour Judge Tindal

Kyiem Dormer, via his mother and litigation friend Iteen Dormer, raised the claim against Mr Dormer’s uncle Jaheim Wilson and joined insurer Green Realisations 123 Ltd and the Motor Insurers Bureau to the claim. The claimant contended that section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 had the effect of making the second defendant liable as the insurer responsible to the claimant as an injured third party, or alternatively that it was indirectly liable through the MIB’s 2015 Uninsured Drivers Agreement. A trial was convened first to determine the issues of liability and contributory negligence. 

The case was heard by High Court Judge James Tindal. Mr Simon Brindle appeared for the claimant and Patrick Blakesley KC for the second defendant. The first defendant represented himself, while the third defendant did not appear. 

Illegality defence 

On 12 April 2017, the claimant, then aged 15, and the first defendant, his 16-year-old uncle, collided with a car after going through a red light at a crossroads. Neither the first defendant nor the claimant, his pillion passenger, were wearing helmets, and it was accepted that no blame lay with the car’s driver. The motorbike involved, a 125cc Yamaha Tricity with two wheels at the front, was reported stolen from its owner’s home a few days before the accident. At the time of the accident, the owner had an insurance policy with the second defendant, under which the first defendant was not insured. 

In his evidence, the first defendant said that he purchased the bike for £150 from a man who approached him in a park asking if he wanted to buy it, although this was dismissed by the judge as untrustworthy. The claimant admitted that his second cousins, the first defendant’s cousins, were associated with gangs. He said that when he first saw the bike he believed it to be a moped due to its appearance and that his uncle was able to ride it legally. 

For the second defendant it was submitted that the judge should infer the claimant had knowledge that the bike was stolen. The claim was barred by the illegality defence because the claimant and first defendant were engaged in joint enterprise dangerous driving. Additionally, the insurance policy excluded payment in relation to any death or injury occurring when the bike was carrying a pillion passenger. 

Counsel for the claimant submitted that the first defendant’s liability to the claimant was not excluded under section 151(4) of the 1988 Act. He had no knowledge that the bike was stolen. The pillion exception in the second defendant’s policy was rendered void by section 148 of the 1988 Act. It was also noted that as worded the exception would bar any claim for injuries arising while carrying a pillion passenger inclusive of injuries to the rider, which was inconsistent with section 143 of the Act. 

Interpret purposively 

In his decision, Judge Tindal said of the credibility of the claimant as a witness: “The Claimant’s evidence was in total contrast to that of the First Defendant. I make allowances both for and against him for the passage of time and effect of his accident (there is no suggestion of retrograde amnesia, but his troubled life since has doubtless coloured his memory). Whilst the Claimant sometimes struggled to articulate what he meant, I found him an essentially truthful and reliable witness.” 

He continued: “I find the Claimant has proved on the balance of probabilities that he was the pillion passenger on the Motorbike. Not only is that his evidence, corroborated by the First Defendant (for what his corroboration is worth), there is no evidence to contradict it. More importantly, it is corroborated by one of the few contemporaneous documents in this case, the Ambulance Record, by paramedics on the scene at 13:15, within 8 minutes of the 999 call by a passer-by. “ 

Considering what role the claimant played in the crash, Tindal J commented: “I have found there was no ‘joyriding’ and it was the First Defendant’s not the Claimant’s decision to cross the traffic of Belgrave Middleway against a red light. It was clearly ‘dangerous driving’ under s.2 RTA, but like Clark, I do not find the Claimant ‘encouraged’ it, let alone ‘intended’ to do so. He would have preferred to go through the subway (and suggested it to the First Defendant but was not heard or ignored). The fact his idea would have jeopardised pedestrians does not mean he ‘encouraged’ the actual dangerous driving.” 

He added: “The Pillion Exclusion is rendered ‘of no effect’ by s.148 RTA and the Policy must be read as if it were deleted. Nevertheless, s.148(3) RTA does not inhibit the Second Defendant’s [ability] to recover any payment from the policyholder (which really seems to be why an exclusion plainly caught by s.148 RTA was included in the first place). Even if I am wrong about that interpretation of s.148(2)(c) RTA on its ‘ordinary meaning’, it should be interpreted purposively to achieve that effect, as that is plainly the purpose of this Part of the RTA - to protect injured third parties.” 

Tindal J concluded on contributory negligence: “Bearing in mind the Claimant’s young age and inexperience, his trust in the older First Defendant who is clearly mainly responsible for the injuries and this being a case of poor decision-making by the Claimant rather than reckless ‘fun’, the appropriate overall reduction (including for the absence of a helmet) is 20 per cent. Any more than that would risk minimising the First Defendant’s joint responsibility for the poor decision, or including non-causative foolishness (like the idea of riding through the subway).” 

Judgment was therefore entered for the claimant against the first defendant in respect of liability, with a 20 per cent reduction for contributory negligence, and the second defendant was held liable to satisfy any final judgment obtained by the claimant. The case proceeded for parties to consider quantum of damages.