Man who raped and abused three former partners loses appeals against conviction and 16-year extended sentence

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] HCJAC 23
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary
• Judge:
  Lord Beckett

Kyle Beveridge was given an in cumulo extended sentence of 16 years with a 12-year custodial term after being found guilty of charges of domestic abuse and rape. The appellant challenged his convictions on charges 1 and 5 of the indictment based on a decision of the trial judge to admit hearsay evidence after late notice was given by the Crown, as well as the length of the extended sentence.

The appeal was heard by the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Beckett, along with Lord Matthews and Lady Wise. Ogg, solicitor advocate, appeared for the appellant and McLean AD for the Crown.

Inherent limitations

At trial, the Crown case generally depended on mutual corroboration between the three complainers, AA, BB, and CC. Charges 1 involved repeated abuse of AA between June 2013 and June 2017, while Charge 5 libelled a single occurrence of rape within the same period. On charge 1, the Crown proposed an alternative route to conviction via a police officer speaking to hearsay evidence of DD, AA’s grandmother, about occasions when she observed AA’s distress and heard her make de recenti statements about incidents within the scope of charge 1. DD’s evidence was also mentioned in respect of charge 5 insofar as it could assist the jury in their assessment of the credibility and reliability of AA’s evidence on that charge.

The only objection to admitting the hearsay evidence came from the paucity of information contained in the application, not its late timing. The trial judge explained that information in the doctor’s letter furnished by the Crown, allied to the well-known effects and progressive nature of Alzheimer’s disease, permitted him to infer that DD remained unfit to give evidence, and therefore granted the application.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in allowing the late admission on such a paucity of information, but supported the conviction on the basis that it had not caused a miscarriage of justice. For the appellant it was submitted that the hearsay evidence could have had a generally supportive effect on the quality of the evidence of AA on both charges 1 and 5. Accordingly, the judge’s decision had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

For the Crown it was submitted that, as the hearsay evidence could not have led to a conviction on charge 5, the jury must have accepted AA’s evidence. On charge 1, the judge had given appropriate warnings to the jury about the inherent limitations of hearsay and such weight as the jury might attach to it. These directions mitigated the effect of its wrongful admission.

In respect of the appeal against sentence the appellant founded on his lack of previous convictions, the fact that he had not previously served a prison sentence, and character references vouching for his rehabilitation as an adult. The appellant was between 17 and 24 when he committed the offences, and thus the sentence was also excessive given his age at the time.

Grave offending

Delivering the opinion of the court, Lord Beckett said on the appeal against conviction: “The judge’s directions and the remarks he made about DD’s hearsay as a possible source of corroboration came in a passage where he expressly referred to charge 1, summarised the conduct alleged in it and explained the effect of a witness observing the complainer’s distress and hearing her statements de recenti. It is entirely clear that these directions related to charge 1 only. The position is more certain still given the judge’s directions on corroboration on charge 5.”

He continued: “The judge directed that before they could convict on any charge, the jury must accept the evidence of the complainer about it. He directed that mutual corroboration for charge 1 could be found in charge 7 and for charge 7 from charge 1. He identified no other route to verdict on charge 7. In light of these directions, the verdict of guilty on both charges 1 and 7 necessarily infers that the jury accepted the evidence of the complainer on each of charges 1 and charge 7 and found mutual corroboration between these charges. In these circumstances, the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence does not give rise to a miscarriage of justice on charge 1, far less charge 5.”

Turning to the appeal against sentence, Lord Beckett said: “In his detailed sentencing remarks, the sentencing judge demonstrates that he took scrupulous care in considering all relevant mitigating and aggravating features of a case where he heard all the evidence. He was bound to take account of the harm caused to the complainers. In the case of two complainers, he had victim statements demonstrating very substantial harm consequent on the appellant’s offending. The appellant’s relatively young age at the time of the offending mitigates culpability but it does not mitigate harm.”

He concluded: “Despite his absence of previous or subsequent offending, and the many favourable testimonials provided, the appellant subjected three different domestic partners to a course of sustained, demeaning and controlling domestic abuse. He raped each of them. This combination of grave offending merited a substantial sentence of imprisonment. The appellant presented a high risk of causing serious harm and as conceded, an extended sentence was necessary to protect the public from serious harm.”

The appeals against conviction and sentence were therefore refused.