Outer House finds intestate farmer did not promise friend she would receive £2.6m estate upon his death

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] CSOH 36
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Court of Session Outer House
• Judge:
  Lord Colbeck

Pursuer Louise Davies raised an action against Lorna Cassie averring that the late William Cassie, the defender’s brother, promised to bequeath her the majority of his estate. She sought an order ordaining the defender, as executrix dative, to convey the estate to the pursuer, or failing that payment of £3.5 million. The deceased’s estate was valued at approximately £2.6m.

The case was heard by Lord Colbeck in the Outer House of the Court of Session, with Upton, advocate, appearing for the pursuer and Jones KC and Reekie, solicitor advocate, appearing for the defender.

Categorical statements

It was averred by the pursuer that she met the deceased in 2010, and they enjoyed a close relationship. She further averred that on many occasions the deceased had told her and others that most of his estate would be passed to her. The defender’s position was that, had the deceased had any settled testamentary intent, he would have made a will to that effect.

The pursuer’s position was that in 2015 or 2016 the deceased met a solicitor in the presence of a friend. The deceased told the solicitor that he wished the pursuer to inherit “some of his estate”, including land in Caithness and at Skares Farm. Secondly, he told a friend, Stephen Taylor, that the pursuer would inherit Skares Farm and the remainder of his estate, as well as his money and a vehicle on the farm.

Mr Cassie was also said to have told the pursuer’s partner that she would “keep the farms” and to have told a farm worker, Adam Wood, that the pursuer would inherit livestock at Skares Farm. Counsel for the pursuer submitted that some of the statements made by the deceased were categorical statements capable of being construed as a commitment, and others were factual predictions.

Ultimately, counsel for the defender accepted that the pursuer’s case in respect of her first conclusion, in which she sought delivery by the defender of a number of items of moveable property, was sufficiently relevant and specific to be admitted to probation. However, her averments in respect of the estate failed to meet the required legal standard to be promises and consequently should be excluded.

No such words

In his decision, Lord Colbeck noted the ambiguity in the pursuer’s averments: “Clear words are required to constitute a promissory obligation in every case. The use of “some of” contradicts the pursuer’s position and is unexplained. It is not averred that the deceased promised to bequeath his heritable and moveable estate to the pursuer in the course of [the meeting with the solicitor].”

He added: “The pursuer’s averments contain nothing by way of clear and unambiguous words of the deceased whereby he promised to bequeath his heritable and moveable estate to the pursuer. The pursuer’s averments in sub-paragraphs (a) to (i) of article 6 are stated to be reiterations of the promise, not the promise itself. As such, they cannot assist the pursuer.”

Addressing other averments of statements made directly to the pursuer, Lord Colbeck said: “It is averred that ‘the deceased said to the pursuer that as he had nobody else to leave his estate to, he would be leaving it to the pursuer and her son.’ The pursuer goes on to aver that, ‘The deceased said that he wanted the pursuer to take on the farms and livestock when he died.’  The first averment in this sub-paragraph gives rise to two issues of significance for the pursuer. Firstly, there are no clear words constituting a promissory obligation. Secondly, the averment directly contradicts the pursuer’s case that the deceased promised to bequeath his heritable and moveable estate to her alone.”

He concluded: “Since any promissory obligation is intention-based, the court’s task is to consider whether the pursuer’s averments, objectively assessed, disclose an intention on the part of the deceased to incur a legally binding engagement. In this case they do not. A promise is binding only if the promisor’s own words are clear and unambiguous. The pursuer avers no such clear and unambiguous words of the deceased.”

The action was therefore dismissed insofar as it related to the pursuer’s second and third conclusions, with the issue of the moveable property proceeding to proof.